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Abstract. This note is a response to an unpublished paper by Evans
and Thomas (1998) of which we have recently become aware.
Evans and Thomas (1998) take issue with a paper that we published some
years back on `Cooperation and Eective Computability' in repeated games
(Anderlini and Sabourian 1995). In that paper we showed that it is only the co-
operative equilibria of an innitely repeated two-player common-interest game
with no discounting that survive both the restriction that players' strategies
must be computable, and appropriately computable trembles.
Evans and Thomas (1998) assert that our results are seemingly not robust
to changes in the set of computable strategies at the disposal of each player. In
particular, they claim that our equilibrium selection result does not extend to
the case in which players are allowed to choose strategies that halt on certain
histories but do not halt on others.
The purpose of this note is to show that the claim in Evans and Thomas
(1998) is misleading. We present a modication of the set-up of our earlier
paper in which the cooperative equilibria are selected when strategies that halt
on certain histories and do not halt on others are allowed.
Although extensive modications are required, the proof of this extension
of our earlier result runs along the same general line of argument as the original
proof.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Anderlini and Sabourian (1995)
In Anderlini and Sabourian (1995) (henceforth A-S) we prove the following result.
Consider an innitely repeated, two-player, nite, strategic-form common-interest
game with no discounting. Assume that the players are constrained to use supergame
strategies that are computable by a Turing machine. Assume further that the only
allowable Turing machines are those that either halt on all possible histories of play
or those that never halt. This yields a normal form (machine) game in which each
player's strategy set is the set of allowable Turing machines and the payos are given
by the long-run average payos associated with each pair of computable strategies.
Now consider the Trembling-Hand Perfect equilibria of this machine game where the
trembles are assumed to be themselves appropriately computable. Then, provided
that the trembles have suciently large support, the unique long-run payo vector
that survives is the Pareto-ecient one in which the players cooperate in the under-
lying common-interest stage game.
The intuition behind the cooperation result in A-S is relatively easy to explain.
The assumption of computable strategies guarantees that the strategy sets of both
players in the supergame are countable. The assumption of computable trembles
as well as computable strategies guarantees that the following construction is well
dened. The set of strategies that are in the support of the perturbation and that
have the property that after cooperating once they do not cooperate for ever after
can be enumerated in a computable way (call this set Q). It now follows that there
exists a computable strategy, call it x, that enumerates `suciently many' strategies
in Q, so that the probability `tail' of strategies that have not been enumerated is
`suciently small'. Strategy x now uses the rst, say, t periods of play to ensure that
its behaviour is dierent from all the strategies in Q that have been enumerated,1
and after t always cooperates (regardless of the previous history of play). Crucially,
to be able to dierentiate itself from the enumerated strategies in Q, strategy x must
simulate what their actions would have been, given a certain history of play.
1A common way to describe this way of proceeding in the mathematical literature is to say that
x `diagonalizes' the machines that have been enumerated.Non-Halting Strategies 2
We can then appeal to a corollary of the so-called Recursion Theorem2 to close
the construction as follows. The probability of the tail mentioned above can be made
arbitrarily small relative to the probability of x itself. Once this is done, it is clear that
the updated probability of facing a cooperative strategy conditional on the history
of play in the rst t periods can be made arbitrarily close to one. Given that the
stage game is one of common interest, any maximizing opponent will then have to
reciprocate by cooperating after date t. In A-S we call a strategy like x a `smart
machine'. We shall do the same here.
A smart machine as above can be constructed for any given computable perturba-
tion. Since we restrict attention to computable perturbations, we can now conclude
that the set of all possible smart machines as above is itself countable. Let this set
of machines be denoted by be R. Theorem 1 in A-S asserts that all equilibria of the
repeated game that are robust to perturbations that include R in their support must
be cooperative.
1.2. Non-Halting Machines
In A-S, non-halting machines are allowed in the support of the perturbations of play-
ers' strategies. Non-halting strategies seem to be a necessary feature for results like
the one in A-S.3 The intuitive reason is that the simulation step that we mentioned
in Subsection 1.1 is not guaranteed to halt. This is a version of a well-known fact
called the halting problem.4
In A-S, to keep matters simple we specify the model in a way that allows us to
consider only two types of machines: the ones that halt and produce a `legal' action
in the stage game on all possible histories of play, and machines that do not halt
on any history of play. In that paper we also discuss the presence of non-halting
machines, and we defend the way in which the players' payos are extended to deal
with these machines. The same arguments apply to the present context. In eect,
a non-halting machine is treated like a machine that makes an `illegal' move in the
2See A-S, Theorem A.7, or Cutland (1980), Theorem 11.1.1 and Corollary 11.1.4. The Recursion
Theorem is a (pseudo) xed-point theorem in the space of Turing machines.
3See also Anderlini (1999) for an application of the same techniques to one-shot common-interest
game with pre-play communication. Non-halting strategies feature in that paper as well.
4See, for instance, Cutland (1980).Non-Halting Strategies 3
game. A chess player who overturns the board instead of making a legal move loses
the game. Assumption 3 below stipulates that the payos to a non-halting machine
are strictly dominated by the payos to some allowable halting machine. Moreover,
according to Assumption 3 below any machine that plays cooperatively is a best
response to any non-halting machine.5 This is consistent with the idea that any legal
move in chess is a best response to a player who overturns the board. Therefore, if we
accept the idea that non-halting machines are present in the game and that the payo
functions must be extended to include these machines, then the payos stipulated in
Assumption 3 below are easy to justify on a primitive, intuitive level.
The fact that there are actual payos associated with the non-halting machines
in this paper (and in A-S) also needs justication. How does a machine that does not
halt come to earn its payo? Since its computation does not halt, and no referee can
ascertain this in advance, when is the payo awarded? Again, an interpretation that
is appealing on a primitive, intuitive, level is not dicult to outline.
The results in this paper (and in A-S) should be interpreted as the result of
the following limit operation. Begin with a model in which the computations of all
allowable Turing machines are only made to run for a maximum of s steps. After s
steps the computations are truncated. If a given machine's computation has halted,
and has yielded a legal action in the stage game in a number of steps less than or equal
to s, then that machine's action is taken to be the result of its computation. On the
other hand, if the given machine does not halt within s steps then its computation is
truncated, and its output is treated as undened. In this case the machine earns the
bad payos exactly as described in Assumption 3 below. Moreover, any completed
computation yielding a legal action in the stage game is a best response to any strategy
prole that contains a truncated computation, again exactly as in Assumption 3
below. For each positive integer s, let G1(s) denote the innitely repeated machine
game in which all computations are truncated at s steps as we have just described.
The results that we present in this paper (and those in A-S) can now be interpreted
as applying to the limit game obtained from G1(s), as s becomes unboundedly large.6
5See also footnote 14 below.
6Note that the same interpretation also applies to the results in Anderlini and Sabourian (1998)
and Anderlini (1999).Non-Halting Strategies 4
In this sense, we are dealing here with a limit case of bounded rationality. As s becomes
larger and larger the computational resources of each machine become larger and
larger. Either the time allowed for each computation expands without bound, or the
steps are executed at an ever increasing speed. In the limit, all that matters is that
the computation halts and yields a legal action in the stage game G. If it does not,
then the extended payos described in Assumption 3 below apply.
Our assumptions of computability, together with the presence of non-halting ma-
chines and associated payos, can therefore be interpreted as restricting attention to
the following world. Strategies and perturbations must be capable of being computed
by some imaginable nite device in a nite number of steps. However, in this world,
the number of steps is not limited in any way by time or other resource constraints.
1.3. Evans and Thomas (1998)
Evans and Thomas (1998) (henceforth E-T) examine a two-player innitely-repeated
common-interest game with no discounting with perturbations that give positive prob-
ability to a countable set of strategies.
They show that, under certain conditions, a necessary condition to select the
cooperative equilibria of the repeated game is that the perturbations give positive
probability to a certain set of `draconian' strategies. A strategy is draconian if, it is
prepared to `minmax' the opposing player `almost all' the time.
The smart machines that drive the main result in A-S are obviously not draconian.
In fact they always cooperate after a certain date. In their paper, E-T ask what drives
the dierent results in the two set-ups. They conclude that the dierence is due to
the way the non-halting machines are treated in A-S. In particular, they claim that
the main result in A-S requires that \the only machines allowable in the supports
of the perturbations are those that always halt and those that never halt" (Evans and
Thomas 1998, page 11). Thus, according to E-T, the main result in A-S is non-robust
in quite a strong sense.
The claim in E-T that we have quoted above is simply false. In this note we show
that the main theorem in A-S can be extended to accommodate strategies that halt
up to a given time t and do not halt after that. This extension of the main result
in A-S requires a number of modications of the original proof. However, the mainNon-Halting Strategies 5
line of reasoning is close to the argument presented in A-S. In Section 3 below we
highlight the main dierences between the proof of the main result in this note and
in A-S.
It should be noted that we are not claiming that the results in A-S extend to
all possible subsets of Turing machines being allowed in the perturbations of the
machine game. For instance, we know that our results do not extend to the two
possible extreme cases: the case in which no non-halting machines are allowed, and
the case in which all Turing machines are allowed. The presence of non-halting
machines is necessary because of the halting problem as we have mentioned above.
The set of all Turing machines appears to be `too rich' to be compatible with the
type of assumptions that are needed for our results.7
It should be emphasized at this point that E-T do not take issue with the presence
of non-halting machines per se,8 but with what they claim is a crucial assumption
about the types of machines that are allowed. In this note, we show that the results
in A-S extend to the case in which a richer set of machines are allowed in the pertur-
bations. We believe that the sets of allowable machines used here are quite appealing
in their own right, and thus strengthen the results in A-S. The Turing machines that
we allow here may halt on some histories and not on others. It seems a natural
restriction to impose that if a machine does not halt at a certain date, then it will
not halt thereafter. Once a machine begins a computation that goes on forever, it
remains stuck in that state at all subsequent dates. The restriction that we have just
described informally is precisely the one that we adopt in this note. In our view,
the further techniques developed here demonstrate that the results in A-S are quite
robust to changes in the model. The sets of allowable machines could be enriched in
various other ways without aecting the basic viability of the main result.
E-T seem to be aware of the fact that extensions of the A-S results similar to the
one are presented here may be possible. They proceed to dismiss their usefulness on
the following grounds. If some sets of allowable machines can be found that make
7See also the discussion in Section 8 of A-S on `Admissibility and Large Support'. Those remarks
apply here virtually unchanged.
8In an earlier version of their paper (see Evans and Thomas (1997, page 2)) the authors state that
\[...] one can defend the assumption that non-halting machines may be present in the perturbations,
[...]".Non-Halting Strategies 6
viable some A-S type selection results, they must be `too strong' as `primitive' as-
sumptions about allowable beliefs. The latter claim, they argue, follows from the fact
that such restrictions on allowable strategies must make it impossible to consider the
perturbations (containing draconian strategies) that they use to prove their results.
This, in our view, is simply the wrong way to judge whether an assumption is a
good primitive restriction on beliefs. Surely, we should judge a primitive restriction
on beliefs (a set of allowable machines in this case) on its own merits, and not on
the type of theorems that it implies. As we stated above, we believe that the sets of
allowable machines that we use in this note are quite natural and appealing in their
own right, and hence acceptable as a primitive restriction on beliefs.
The results in A-S and in this note rely heavily on certain properties of computable
functions.9 In particular, the computability framework allows us to use the fact
that Turing machines can `simulate' the computations of other Turing machines,10 a
parameterization result known as the `s-m-n' theorem,11, and, crucially, the Recursion
Theorem12 that guarantees the feasibility of the xed-point argument that we have
mentioned above. These properties of the computability framework are simply not
available in a model that allows any countable set of strategies in the perturbations
of a repeated game.
The strength of the results in A-S, in our view, is therefore measured by how
appealing we think the computability restrictions on strategies and perturbations
really is. In A-S we have defended the computability framework at some length,
and we will not repeat those arguments in this note. Here we simply recall that the
notion of computability that we use is widely accepted in the mathematical literature
as embodying the widest possible notion of `eective computability'. Any function
that is eectively computable by any imaginable nite device in a nite number of
steps is in fact computable by a Turing machine.13 We do not know whether the
9See also Anderlini and Sabourian (1998) and Anderlini (1999) for two further related papers.
The former contains an extension to N-player games of the main result in A-S
10We are referring to the existence of a so-called `Universal Turing Machine'. See, for instance,
Cutland (1980), Ch. 5.
11See, for instance Cutland (1980), Theorem 4.4.3.
12See footnote 2 above.
13This is a claim known as Church's thesis in the literature on recursive functions. See Cutland
(1980) again for further details.Non-Halting Strategies 7
techniques developed in A-S can be extended to a framework that does not appeal
explicitly to the notion of eective computability. It is of course possible that some
other sets of restrictions on strategies and perturbations will yield equivalent results.
We conclude this section with the observation that the techniques developed in A-S
and in this note are suciently powerful to yield selection results in repeated common-
interest games with discounting and with nite horizon (Anderlini and Sabourian
1990) and to N-player repeated common-interest games (Anderlini and Sabourian
1998). By contrast, the use of draconian strategies as a device to select the cooperative
equilibria of a repeated common-interest game developed in E-T does not appear to
be robust to any of these changes in the model.
2. An Extension of Theorem 1 of Anderlini and Sabourian (1995)
2.1. Notation and Basics
We conform to the notation used in A-S whenever possible. We also refer extensively
to that paper for some of the results that carry over from there in order to save space.
Using a standard technique known as G odel numbering, Turing machines and their
inputs and outputs can be put in a one-to-one (computable) correspondence with the
natural numbers. Throughout the paper IN denotes the set of natural numbers. The
result of the computation of the Turing machine with G odel number x 2 IN when
applied to the input string coded by the G odel number y 2 IN is denoted by 'x(y).
The notation 'x(y) " and 'x(y) # respectively indicate that the computation 'x(y)
does not halt (it `loops'), and that it does halt.
Definition 1: A function f from IN
m to IN is said to be computable if and only if
9x 2 IN such that f(y1;;ym) ' 'x(y1;;ym) 8 (y1;;ym) 2 IN
m
The symbol `'' used between two Turing machines, two computable functions or any
combination of these means `dened on the same set of inputs and equal whenever
dened'.
The stage game of the repeated game we consider is denoted by b G = f b Ai; ^ igi=1;2.
We take b G to be a nite-action, two-player, strategic-form game. A generic playerNon-Halting Strategies 8
will be denoted by i = 1;2, and unless otherwise stated j will denote i's opposing
player. Player i's nite action set is denoted by b Ai, and b A = b A1  b A2 is the players'
joint action set. Typical elements of b Ai and b A are denoted by ^ ai and ^ a respectively.
Following standard notation, ^ i : b A ! IR denotes player i's payo function, while
^  : b A ! IR
2 yields a payo vector given an action pair ^ a 2 b A. Let b V , with typical
element ^  = (^ 1; ^ 2), be the payo space of b G. In other words, b V = ^ ( b A).
Assumption 1: The stage game b G is a common-interest game. In other words there
exists a ^ e 2 b V (which may be associated with more than one pair of strategies) that
strongly Pareto-dominates all other elements of b V . The action prole ae 2 b A denotes
one (arbitrarily xed) pair of actions which yields payo pair e to the players.
For the sake of simplicity only we will focus attention on common-interest games in
which each player has at least three pure strategies available. In A-S we discuss at
some length why this property is not needed for our results. The same remarks apply
here unchanged.
Assumption 2: The cardinality of both b A1 and b A2 is at least three.
In A-S we extend the payos of the innitely repeated game to take into account
the possibility of non-halting machines making two assumptions directly on the long-
run payos of the two players. In the context of A-S this seems by far the simplest
way to proceed.
In this note we consider machines that never halt, machines that always halt and
machines that halt on histories of up to a given length, but do not halt thereafter. In
this context, it seems more appropriate to extend the players' payo functions at the
stage game level. Our way of proceeding here is completely consistent with the way
the corresponding assumption is formulated in A-S.
Some extra notation is required. Let Ai = b Ai [ ", so that Ai is payer i's strategy
set in the stage game b G plus the non-halting action, denoted by ". Let also A = A1 
A2. We can now dene the extended payo function  : A ! IR
2. This yields a pair
of stage game payos for every pair of actions a 2 A. Our next step is to assume that
 is such that not halting is a strictly dominated strategy for either player, and that
playing the cooperative action ae
i is a best response to an opposing player that doesNon-Halting Strategies 9
not halt.14 For every action pair in the original set b A, the extended payo function
, of course, is the same as the original payo function ^ .
Assumption 3: The extended payo function  satises the following properties.
First of all for every a 2 b A, (a) = ^ (a). Moreover, for i = 1;2 we have that
9^ ai 2 b Ai suchthat i(^ ai;aj) > i(";aj) 8aj 2 Aj (Dominance)
i(a
e
i;")  i(ai;") 8ai 2 Ai (Best Response)
The stage game with joint action set A and payo functions  is denoted by G.
The payo space of G is denoted by V .
The undiscounted innitely repeated game obtained from G is denoted by G1.
Let ait 2 Ai be player i's action at time t = 0;1;2, and at 2 A the players' joint
action at t. Let Ht = At be the set of all possible nite histories of play of length t,
with typical element ht = (a0;;at 1) (dene h0 to be the empty set). The set of
all possible nite histories of play, regardless of length, is denoted by H 
S1
t=0 Ht.
A strategy for player i in G1 is a map i : H ! Ai. The joint action that players
take at time t along the outcome path induced by  will be indicated by at() =
(a1t();a2t()). The history of length t generated by a pair of supergame strategies
 is denoted by ht() = [a0();;at 1()]. The long-run undiscounted payo to
player i is liminfT!1
1
T
PT
t=0 i[at()].
Since G is a nite-action game and we do not consider mixed strategies within
the stage game, we can use the standard techniques above to code (in a computable
way) any element of H into an element of IN. The elements of Ai can also obviously
be assigned codes in IN. It follows that a strategy in G1 can always be viewed as a
function from IN to IN. Since this does not cause any ambiguity, now and throughout
the rest of the paper, we shall use the same symbol for ht 2 H and ai, and for their
`codes' in IN.
14Evidently, this includes as a special case the possibility that any halting choice is a best response
to a non-halting opponent.Non-Halting Strategies 10
2.2. The Set of Allowable Turing Machines
As we mentioned above, we are forced to consider some Turing machines that do
not always halt and produce a legal action in G1. The crucial point here is that
we are able to consider a set of machines that is richer than that allowed in A-S. In
particular, we are able to include machines that halt on all histories up to a certain
length and do not halt thereafter. This motivates out next denition.
Let S;
i = fxi 2 IN such that 'xi(ht) " for all ht 2 Hg. For every t = 0;1;2; :::
dene also St
i = fxi 2 IN such that 'xi(h) # 2 Ai for every h with   t, and
'xi(h) " for every h with  > tg. Lastly, let S1
i = fxi 2 IN such that 'xi(ht) #
2 Ai for every ht 2 Hg. In other words, S; is the set of machines that do not halt
on any history, while St is the set of machines that halt on all histories of length less
than or equal to t and do not halt on any history of length greater than t , and nally
S1 is the set of machines that halt on all histories of play, regardless of length.
Definition 2: The set of allowable Turing machines for player i in G1 is the set of
all machines that halt on all histories up to a given length and do not halt thereafter,
together with machines that never halt and with machines that always halt. In other
words, the set of allowable machines for player i is dened as
Si 
( 1 [
t=0
S
t
i [ S
;
i [ S
1
i
)
(1)
Notice that in A-S machines of the type contained in the sets St
i are not allowed.
In this sense the sets of allowable machines are richer in this note that in A-S. The
purpose of this note is to show that the results in A-S extend to this case.
Given a pair of Turing machines (x1;x2) in S = S1  S2, we can clearly dene an
outcome path in G1 in the standard recursive way as above. The joint action at time t
is denoted by at(x1;x2) 2 A. The history of length t generated by (x1;x2) is denoted
by ht(x1;x2)  fa0(x1;x2), , at 1(x1;x2)g 2 At. Given a pair (x1;x2) 2 S, the
long-run payo to player i is denoted by i(x1;x2) = liminfT!1
1
T
PT
t=0 i[at(x1;x2)].
The long-run continuation payo to player i conditional on history ht is denoted by
i(x1;x2jht).Non-Halting Strategies 11
2.3. Admissible Trembles
As in A-S we need the perturbations of the machine game that we have dened in
Subsection 2.1 to satisfy two main computability restrictions. It is convenient to state
the rst one in terms of an abstract probability distribution over IN before using it to
dene the admissible perturbations of the machine game. The following is identical
to Denition 6 in A-S.
Definition 3: A Probability distribution P = fP(1);P(2);;P(x);g over IN is
said to be `computable' if and only if there exists a Turing machine that computes
(at least) all non-zero values of P as a function of x. Formally, let 1 represent the
unit simplex in IR
1 and supp(P) = fx 2 IN j P(x) > 0g, then P 2 1 is said to be
computable if and only if 9 p 2 IN such that x 2 supp(P) implies
'p(x) = P(x)
and 'p(x) #) 'p(x) = P(x).
The second restriction on computable trembles concerns the ability to enumerate
and compute the probability of the tail of the set Q of non-cooperative machines as
we described in the introduction. Since the set of allowable machines in this note
is dierent from what we considered in A-S, the denition of the set Q needs to be
modied. The dierence between what we do here and what is carried out in A-S
is driven by the fact that we need to avoid the possibility that the smart machine
described in Subsection 1.1 may have to simulate some machines that do not halt in
order to distinguish itself from the set Q. Of course, at the same time we need to
ensure that convincing the opposing player that the strategy employed is not in Q is
still sucient to trigger cooperation in the long-run.
We start by dening the set of Turing machines that after cooperating once are
guaranteed either to play the cooperative action or to not halt. Given any history of
play ht, if another history of play ht0 is a continuation of history ht, we write ht0  ht.
Any history ht0 that is either equal to ht or is a continuation of ht will be indicated
as ht0  ht.Non-Halting Strategies 12
Let
Zi = fxi 2 Si j 'xi(ht) = a
e
i ) either 'xi(ht0) = a
e
i or 'xi(ht0) " 8 ht0  htg (2)
and let Zi denote the complement of Zi in Si. Next, we dene the set of machines
that do not halt for some history of length less than or equal to the G odel number of
the machine itself. Let
Xi = fxi 2 Si j 9t  xi 9ht 2 Ht such that 'xi(ht) "g (3)
and let X i denote the complement of Xi in Si. The following is the equivalent of
Denition 7 of A-S in the present context.
Definition 4: Let Qi = Zi [ Xi. Any machine in Qi is called quasi-cooperative.
Let Qi denote the complement of Qi in Si. Thus Qi is the set of allowable machines
that are not quasi-cooperative.
Notice that, because of Assumption 3 signaling that one's strategy is quasi-cooperative
is an eective way to trigger cooperation in the machine game. To see why we have
included the machines in Xi in the set of quasi-cooperative machine observe the
following fact. Since Qi is the complement of Qi, we clearly have that Qi = Zi \
X i. Therefore, any machine xi in Qi has the property that it halts on all histories of
play of length up to and including t = xi. This fact enables us to avoid the need for
a smart machine that attempts simulate a strategy that does not halt.15
We are interested in trembles that guarantee that the probability of Qi is com-
putable. Since both Qi and Qi are innite sets, this is not a property which follows
automatically from computability of the probability distribution in the sense of Def-
inition 3. Our next Denition is identical (save for the fact that Qi is a dierent set)
to Denition 8 of A-S.
Definition 5: A Probability distribution P = fP(1);P(2);;P(x);g over the
natural numbers is said to be Qi-computable if and only if the probability that P
15See the proof of Lemma B.4 and Section 3 below in which we highlight the main dierences
between the proof of the main result in A-S and the argument presented here.Non-Halting Strategies 13
assigns to Qi is a `computable real number' in the sense that it can be approximated
by a Turing machine up to any arbitrarily given degree of precision. Formally, let
P(Qi) =
P
x2Qi P(x) then P 2 1 is said to be Qi-computable if and only if 9q 2 IN
such that
j 'q(c)   P(Qi) j <
1
c
8 c 2 IN
Our next step is to dene the probability distributions that will constitute the
trembles of our machine game. This is the equivalent of Denition 9 in A-S.
Definition 6: A Probability distribution P = fP(1);P(2);;P(x);g over IN
is said to be admissible for player i if and only if a) it gives positive probability
only to machines in Si, b) it is computable according to Denition 3, and c) it is
Qi-computable according to Denition 5. We denote by Pi the set of probability
distributions that are admissible for player i.
Lemma B.2 shows that, given any admissible probability distribution, the set
Q
P
i = supp(P) \ Qi is recursively enumerable.16 Therefore, exactly as in A-S, there
are three Turing machines associated with each Pi 2 Pi. One which computes the
probabilities of individual machines, one which computes the probability of Qi, and
a third one which `enumerates' the elements of Q
P
i . We will refer to such a triple of
Turing machines as a `basis' for P.
Definition 7: A triple (p;q;m) 2 IN
3 is said to be a `basis' for an admissible P 2 Pi
if and only if 'p() computes the values of P as in Denition 3, 'q() computes
(approximately) the value of P(Qi) as in Denition 5, and 'm() `enumerates' Q
P
i
`without repetitions' (as in Theorems A.3 and A.4) .17
2.4. Equilibrium
The concept of equilibrium that we use here is identical to the one used in A-S. There,
we discuss at length its justication and possible interpretations. Here, for the sake
of brevity, we only reproduce the formal denitions without comment.
16See Denition A.2.
17If Q
P
i is empty, we require m to compute the function `nowhere dened'.Non-Halting Strategies 14
Exactly as in A-S, we parameterize the possible perturbations by a `lower bound'
on their support. Given any Ri  IN, let
Pi(Ri)  f P 2 
1 j Ri  supp(P) and P is admissible for i g
Next, we establish some notation for the machines in Si that are a best response to
a given strategy and perturbation. Given any xj in Sj, P, and  2 (0;1), let
Bi(xj;P;)  argmax
xi2Si
8
<
:(1   )i(xi;xj) + 
X
x2Sj
P(x)i(xi;x)
9
=
;
An (;R) Computable Trembling Hand Equilibrium (with (R = (R1;R2)) is a pair
of computable strategies and a pair of perturbations, with support at least Ri re-
spectively, such that the given strategies are a best response to each other given the
perturbations. The two denitions that follow are the same as Denitions 11 and 12
of A-S.
Definition 8: An (;R) Computable Trembling Hand Equilibrium (abbreviated
(;R)-CTHE) is a quadruple (xE
1 ;xE
2 ;P1;P2) with xE
i 2 Si and Pi 2 Pi(Ri) such
that 8i = 1;2
x
E
i 2 Bi(x
E
j ;Pj;)
The set of equilibrium quadruples for a given pair (;R) is denoted by E(;R), the
set of equilibrium long-run payo pairs is denoted by E(;R).
Definition 9: A R-CTHE is the limit of any sequence of E(;R) as  vanishes.
The set of R-CTHE is denoted by E(R).
2.5. Selecting Cooperative Equilibria in the Repeated Game
We are now ready to state our main result. The statement of the theorem that
follows is identical to the main result in A-S. In the limit, as the noise vanishes,
all Computable Trembling-Hand Equilibria of the machine game are cooperative,
provided that the perturbations have `suciently large' support.Non-Halting Strategies 15
Of course, the main dierence between Theorem 1 below and Theorem 1 in A-S
is that here we have machines that halt on some histories but not on others in the
sets of allowable machines Si.
Theorem 1: There exists a set R = (R1;R2)  IN
2 such that
E(;R) 6= ; 8  2 [0;1]
and

E(R) = 
e
Proof: See Appendix B.
We conclude this Section with two observations. The rst is the same as Remark
1 in A-S.
Remark 1: Recall that, in our denition of equilibrium, the sets Ri are `lower
bounds' on the support of the perturbations. It follows that whenever Ri  R0
i
8i = 1;2, we must have E(R0)  E(R). Therefore Theorem 1 implies that all
Computable Trembling Hand Equilibria with perturbations having supports larger
than the sets Ri of Theorem 1 are cooperative.
Our last remark concerns the absence draconian strategies from the sets Ri of
Theorem 1.
Remark 2: As is apparent from the proof of Theorem 1 all the machines in the
sets Ri are quasi-cooperative in the sense of Denition 4. Thus the sets Ri do not
contain any machines that are draconian in the sense of E-T. This is in marked
contrast with Theorem 1 in their paper. Their result asserts that the presence of
draconian strategies in the perturbations is necessary to induce cooperation in an
innitely-repeated undiscounted two-player common-interest game.
The stark dierence between the two results stems from the computability restric-
tions on players' strategies and on the perturbations of the repeated game, and from
the sets of allowable machines that are used here.Non-Halting Strategies 16
3. The Proof of Theorem 1: Comparison to A-S
The basic intuition behind Theorem 1 above and behind Theorem 1 in A-S is essen-
tially the same. It revolves around the `diagonalization' argument that we described
in Subsection 1.1 above. Our aim here is just to highlight the two main dierences
in the way the formal argument is carried out here and in A-S.
The rst dierence lies in the way Lemma B.4 is stated and proved here, compared
to its equivalent (Lemma 2) in A-S. In Lemma B.4 we show that it is in fact feasible
for the smart machine xi to distinguish itself from (most of) the machines in Qi by
simulating the machines that are not in the tail of Qi and then setting its own action
to be dierent from each of these machines as times goes from 0 to t.
In A-S, this step can be carried out simply by enumerating an appropriately large
subset of Qi (so that the tail that has not been enumerated has suciently small
probability), then simulating the machines that have been enumerated, and nally
setting the actions of xi to be dierent from the actions that have been so computed.
This can always be done in A-S in this simple way because the only machines from
which xi needs to distinguish itself are machines that always halt. In this note, we
face a further diculty in carrying out this step since some of the machines that have
been enumerated may be machines that halt on all histories up to a certain length
and do not halt after that. The solution to the diculty lies in the fact that here we
have included in the set Qi all those machines xi that are certain to stop halting on
or before t = xi. It follows that all the machines to be simulated in Qi are certain to
halt on any history of length up to t = xi. We can then rearrange the machines to
be simulated in ascending order and simulate the rst one on h0, the second one on
h1 and so on up to ht. Since each machine is certain to halt up to time t = xi, it is
now clear that all these simulations are certain to halt as is required.
The second main dierence between the proof of the main result here and in A-S is
in the way that Lemma B.6 is proved here, compared with the equivalent Lemma 4 in
A-S. Lemma B.6 states that (unless the equilibrium is cooperative already) the long-
run payo to the smart machine xi against the equilibrium machine xE
j must be e
j, in
the limit as the degree of precision with which xi reveals itself to be quasi-cooperative
increases without bound.
Observe that in A-S once the smart machine has halted once, it has revealedNon-Halting Strategies 17
itself to be a machine that halts on all histories of play regardless of length. This
is precisely because in A-S only machines that either always halt or never halt are
allowed. Therefore in A-S we are able to prove Lemma 4 using the following relatively
simple argument. Once the signaling phase of the smart machine xi has ended, a
machine xj that always cooperates will achieve an expected continuation payo that
is arbitrarily close to e
j. Therefore, since xE
j must be optimal in expected terms
given any history of play that takes place with positive probability, the expected
continuation payo to xE
j must also be arbitrarily close to e
j. Since G is a common-
interest game this now implies that the payo to the smart machine xi against xE
j
must be arbitrarily close to e
i as required.
In this note, because we are allowing machines that only halt on histories up to a
certain length and do not halt after that, and since we need to modify the denition
of the set Qi accordingly, the argument above is not viable anymore. In particular,
as before, once the signaling phase of the smart machine has ended at t, the opposing
player knows that he is facing a machine in Qi with probability arbitrarily close to
one. However, the set Qi contains machines that halt up to t but stop halting at
dates after t. Therefore, it is no longer true that a machine xj that cooperates for
ever will achieve an expected continuation payo arbitrarily close to e
j.
We circumvent this diculty using Assumption 3 (Best Response).18 This tells
us that cooperating is a best response to machines that do not halt. Recall that,
after the signaling phase of the smart machine xi has ended, the opposing player
faces machines that either cooperate or do not halt with probability arbitrarily close
to one. Therefore, a machine that does not cooperate `almost all the time' after the
signaling phase has ended cannot be one that maximizes its expected continuation
payo. Therefore, the equilibrium machine xE
j must cooperate almost all the time
after the signaling phase of xi is over. Therefore, we can now conclude that the payo
of xi against xE
j is arbitrarily close to e
i as required.
18It is interesting to notice that the best response assumption plays no role in the optimality of
equilibrium statement in Theorem 1 of A-S. There, this assumption is only used to prove that the set
of equilibria is not empty. By contrast, here it is needed to show that all equilibria are cooperative.Non-Halting Strategies 18
Appendix A: Preliminaries
We start with some basic results from the literature on recursive functions. For reasons of space,
we refer extensively to A-S whenever this allows us to omit a proof altogether. The proofs that are
given here are self-contained wherever possible. All results that are stated without proof or reference
to A-S can be found, for instance, in Cutland (1980) or Rogers (1967).
Definition A.1: A computable function f : IN
m ! IN is called a total computable function if and
only if f(e1;;em) # 8(e1;;em) 2 IN
m.
Theorem A.1 [s-m-n]: For each m  0 and n  1 there exists a total computable function of m+1
variables f such that 8 e 2 IN and 8 (h1;;hm;hm+1;;hm+n) 2 IN
m+n we have
'e(h1;;hm+n) ' 'f(e;h1;;hm)(hm+1;;hm+n)
Theorem A.2 [Universal Turing Machine]: Given any m  1, there exists a number u, such that
'u(n;e1;;em) ' 'n(e1;;em) 8 (n;e1;;em) 2 IN
m+1
Definition A.2: A set S  IN is recursively enumerable (abbreviated r.e.) if and only if it is equal
to the domain of a computable function. Formally, S  IN is r.e. if and only if for some n 2 IN we
have 'n(e) # , e 2 S. (The empty set is r.e. since the function `nowhere dened' is computable.)
Theorem A.3: An innite set S  IN is r.e. if and only if it is the range of a one-to-one total
computable function of one variable. Formally, given an innite set S  IN, S is r.e. if and only
if there exists a Turing machine n computing a total computable function such that v 6= v0 )
'n(v) 6= 'n(v0) and
e 2 S , 9v such that 'n(v) = e
The Turing machine n is said to enumerate S `without repetitions'.
Theorem A.4: Any nite set is r.e. Any nite set can be enumerated `without repetitions' in the
following way. Let x0; :::; xS be the elements of S. Then there exists a Turing machine n computing
a total computable function such that 'n(s) = xs for s = 0; :::; S, and 'n(s) = xS for all s > S.
Theorem A.5: The intersection of two r.e. sets is r.e. The union of two r.e. sets is r.e.
Theorem A.6 [Pseudo-Fixed Point]: For any computable function f of m+1 variables, there exists
x 2 IN such that
'x(e1;;em) ' f(x;e1;;em) 8 (e1;;em) 2 IN
mNon-Halting Strategies 19
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma B.1: The set supp(P) is r.e. for any P 2 1 which is computable in the sense of Denition
3. It follows that the same statement is true for any P 2 1 which is admissible in the sense of
Denition 6.
Proof: See Lemma A.1 in A-S.
Lemma B.2: Let P be a probability distribution that is admissible in the sense of Denition 6.
Then the set Q
P
i  supp(P) \ Qi is r.e.
Proof: Consider the sets
b Zi = fxi 2 IN j9ht 9ht0 such that ht0  ht; 'xi(ht) = ae
i and 'xi(ht0) #6= ae
ig (B.1)
and
b Xi = fxi 2 IN j 'xi(ht) # 8ht 2 Ht with t  xig (B.2)
Observe that b Zi and b Xi are respectively the same as Zi and X i but with xi ranging in IN rather
than in Si.
By Church's thesis, it is easy to establish that the functions
fb Zi(xi) =
(
1 if xi 2 b Zi
" otherwise
and fb Xi(xi) =
(
1 if xi 2 b Xi
" otherwise
(B.3)
are computable. Therefore, by Denition A.2 we can conclude that the sets b Zi and b Xi are r.e. Notice
next that since P is admissible and therefore supp(P) 2 Si we must have that
Q
P
i = supp(P) \ Qi = supp(P) \ Zi \ Xi = supp(P) \ b Zi \ b Xi (B.4)
Lastly, recall that by Lemma B.1 we know that supp(P) is r.e. Therefore, using the right-hand side
of (B.4), we know that Q
P
i is the intersection of a three r.e. sets. By Lemma A.5 this is clearly
enough to prove the claim.
Lemma B.3: There exists a computable function di from IN
5 to IN such that 8(x;p;q;m;k) 2 IN,
whenever (p;q;m) is a basis (as in Denition 7) for an admissible probability distribution P 2 Pi,
and P(x) > 0 we have di(x;p;q;m;k) = ~ t, where ~ t satises
1
k
'p(x) > P(Qi)  
~ t 1 X
=0
'p('m()) (B.5)Non-Halting Strategies 20
Proof: Identical to the proof of Lemma 1 of A-S.
Lemma B.4: There exists a computable function gi from IN
6 to IN such that 8(x;p;q;m;k;ht) 2 IN
6
whenever (p;q;m) forms a basis for an admissible probability distribution P 2 Pi, and P(x) > 0,
we have
gi(x;p;q;m;k;ht) 
(
ae
i 2 Ai if ht has t  ~ t
ai 2 Ai with ai 6= ae
i and ai 6= ''r(m;t;~ t)(ht) if ht has t < ~ t
(B.6)
where ~ t is as in Lemma B.3, and 'r(m;t;~ t) is the t-th element in ascending order of the set ('m(0);
:::; 'm(~ t   1)). Moreover, for any (x;p;q;m;k) 2 IN
5, either gi(x;p;q;m;k;ht) " for all ht or
gi(x;p;q;m;k;ht) # for all ht.
Proof: A Turing machine d that computes gi can be constructed as follows. Start by computing
the value of ~ t as in Lemma B.3. If this computation does not halt, leave the output of d undened.
If this computation halts, proceed further as follows.
Compute all the elements of the set ('m(0); :::; 'm(~ t   1)). Observe that if (p;q;m) is a basis
for an admissible probability distribution, then m computes a total computable function and hence
all these computations halt. If any of the computations 'm(t) for t = 0;:::; ~ t 1 do not halt, leave
the output of d undened. If all these computations halt, proceed further as follows.
Rearrange the elements of the set ('m(0); :::; 'm(~ t   1)) in ascending order. In other words,
compute 'r(m;t;~ t) for every t = 0;::: ~ t   1. Notice that this step is clearly feasible by Church's
thesis since it involves rearranging a nite set.
Compute the results of all the computations ''r(m;;~ t)(h) for every  = 0;::: ~ t   1 and for
every h 2 H. Observe that if (p;q;m) is a basis for an admissible probability distribution, then
all these computations halt. This is because, by construction (the elements of ('r(m;0;~ t); :::;
('r(m;~ t   1;~ t)) are in ascending order), we know that 'r(m;;~ t)  . This coupled with the fact
that 'r(m;;~ t) 2 X i implies that the result of the computation ''r(m;;~ t)(h) is dened for every
h 2 H. If any of the computations ''r(m;;~ t)(h) do not halt, leave the output of d undened.
Otherwise, proceed further as follows.
Check whether ht is such that t  ~ t. If this is the case, simply set the output of d to be equal to
ae
i. If ht is such that t < ~ t then set the output of d to be dierent from both ae
i and ''r(m;t;~ t)(ht)
(the result of the latter computation was in fact computed in the previous step) . This step is always
feasible since, by Assumption 2, Ai has at least three elements.
Clearly the procedure we have outlined denes a d that computes a function gi as required.
Clearly if P(x) > 0 and (p;q;m) is a basis for an admissible probability distribution then ~ t as in
Lemma B.3 and the value of gi is dened for every ht. Finally, it is clear that, by construction, for
any (x;p;q;m;k) 2 IN
5, either gi(x;p;q;m;k;ht) " for all ht or gi(x;p;q;m;k;ht) # for all ht.Non-Halting Strategies 21
Definition B.1: Given a probability distribution P 2 1, the symbol Pht 2 1 stands for the
distribution P updated on the basis of history ht using Bayes' rule.
Definition B.2: A Turing machine xi 2 Si is said to be consistent with history ht if and only
if there exists an xj 2 Sj such that ht(xi;xj) = ht. The set of machines xi consistent with ht is
denoted by Di(ht).
Definition B.3: Given any ht, the set of Turing machines that are quasi-cooperative and are
consistent with ht is denoted by Qi(ht) = Qi \ Di(ht).
Definition B.4: A Turing machine xi 2 Si is said to be almost-cooperative after ht if and only
if it is consistent with ht and is certain to either cooperate or not halt on any history that is a
continuation of ht. The set of Turing machines xi that are almost-cooperative after ht is denoted
by Fi(ht), and is dened as
Fi(ht) = fxi 2 Qi(ht) j either 'xi(ht0) = ae
i 8 ht0  ht or 'xi(ht0) " for some ht0  htg (B.7)
Lemma B.5 [Communication Lemma]: There exists Ri  Si such that 8 P 2 Pi(Ri) 8 c 2 IN there
exist a machine x
ic 2 IN and a t for which the following conditions hold.19
1
c
Pht(x

ic;xj)(x
ic) > Pht(x

ic;xj)(Qi) 8t  t 8xj 2 Sj (B.8)
Fi(ht(x
ic;xj)) = Qi(ht(x
ic;xj)) 8t  t 8xj 2 Sj (B.9)
'x
ic(ht) = ae
i 8t  t   1 (B.10)
Proof: The s-m-n Theorem A.1 guarantees that there exists a total computable function s : IN
5
! IN such that
's(x;p;q;m;k)(ht) ' 'x(p;q;m;k;ht) 8 (x;p;q;m;k;ht) 2 IN
6 (B.11)
By the existence of a universal machine (Theorem A.2) and by Church's thesis, fi from IN
6 to IN
dened by
fi(x;p;q;m;k;ht)  gi(s(x;p;q;m;z);p;q;m;k;ht) (B.12)
19The value of x
ic depends on P as well as on c, and the value of t depends on P, c and x
ic itself.
We suppress this from the notation whenever there is no risk of ambiguity.Non-Halting Strategies 22
where gi is as in Lemma B.4, is a computable function. By the pseudo-xed point Theorem A.6 we
then have that 9 xi 2 IN such that
'xi(p;q;m;k;ht) ' fi(xi;p;q;m;k;ht) 8 (p;q;m;k;ht) 2 IN
5 (B.13)
Substituting (B.11) and (B.12) in (B.13) we nally obtain that
's(xi;p;q;m;k)(ht) ' gi(s(xi;p;q;m;k);p;q;m;k;ht) 8 (p;q;m;k;ht) 2 IN
5 (B.14)
Consider now a xed P 2 Pi and its basis (p;q;m) 2 IN
3. Suppose that for such given basis and
given k we have that
'p(s(xi;p;q;m;k)) > 0 (B.15)
where xi is the pseudo-xed point of equation (B.13), and set
x
ik  s(xi;p;q;m;k) (B.16)
Now set t = ~ t+1, where ~ t is as in (B.5) of Lemma B.3. From (B.14) and from the construction
of gi in Lemma B.4 we immediately know that x
ic satises condition (B.10) of the statement of the
Lemma, as required.
To see that condition (B.9) is satised, simply notice that the claim follows immediately from
the denitions of Fi() and of Qi, and the fact that 'x
ic(ht(x
ic;xj)) = ae
i.
Since gi is as in Lemma B.4, by construction we have that
ht(x
ik;xj) 6= ht('r(m;t;~ t);xj) 8 xj 2 Sj 8 t < ~ t (B.17)
Since ~ t is as in (B.5) of Lemma B.3, (B.17) implies
1
k
Pht(x

ic;xj)(x
ic) > Pht(x

ic;xj)(Qi) 8t  t 8xj 2 Sj (B.18)
and setting k = c in (B.18) immediately gives condition (B.8), as required.
To close the argument we must now dene Ri so as to ensure that (B.15) is satised 8 P 2
Pi(Ri), 8 k 2 IN. It is clearly sucient to set
Ri  Range s(xi;p;q;m;k)
(p;q;m;k)2I N
4 (B.19)
and to notice that using Lemma B.4 it must be that Ri  Si. Therefore, the proof of the Lemma is
now complete.Non-Halting Strategies 23
Lemma B.6: Assume that Ri is as in (B.19) 8i = 1;2. Fix an  > 0, and let an equilibrium
quadruple (xE
1 ;xE
2 ;P1;P2) 2 E(;R) be given. If it is not the case that i(xE
i ;xE
j ) = e
i 8i = 1;2,
then for some i we have that
8  > 0 9c 2 IN such that

e
i   i(x
ic;xE
j )

 <  (B.20)
where x
ic is the revealing strategy of the Communication Lemma corresponding to the level of
precision c 2 IN (as in equation (B.8)) and the actual perturbation Pi of the equilibrium quadruple.
Proof: Since it is not the case that i(xE
i ;xE
j ) = e
i 8i = 1;2; it must be that ait(xE
i ;xE
j ) 6= ae
i
for some i and for innitely many t. Because x
ic satises condition (B.10) of the Communication
Lemma, this implies that for some t it must be that ait(x
ic;xE
j ) 6= ait(xE
i ;xE
j ): Let ^ t be the minimum
t for which this is the case. Also let t = maxf^ t;tg;where t is the date associated with x
ic as in the
Communication Lemma. Therefore, by date t; x
ic has the following two properties: (i) it satises
(B.8), and (ii) has revealed itself to be dierent from the equilibrium strategy xE
i .
Our next step is to divide the expected continuation payo of a generic machine xj 2 Sj after
history ht(x
ic;xE
j ) into several components, in a way that will become useful later in the proof.
We start by dening those machines that are not only almost-cooperative after ht(x
ic;xE
j ), but
are in fact certain to cooperate on input ht(x
ic;xE
j ) and on any history that follows ht(x
ic;xE
j ).
Let,
Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j )) =

xi 2 Fi(ht(x
ic;xE
j )) j 'xi(ht0) = ae
i 8ht0  ht(x
ic;xE
j )
	
(B.21)
Observe that clearly it is the case that Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j ))  Fi(ht(x
ic;xE
j )). Let also Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j ))
be the complement of Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j )) in Fi(ht(x
ic;xE
j )).
The continuation (expected) payo to machine xj 2 Si after ht(x
ic;xE
j ) can be written as
X
xi2Qi[Qi
P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (xi)j(xi;xj jht(x
ic;xE
j )) (B.22)
Because of (B.9) of the Communication Lemma, we can re-write (B.22) as
X
xi2Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j ))[Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j ))[Qi
P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (xi)j(xi;xj jht(x
ic;xE
j )) (B.23)
Observe next that if xi 2 Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j )) then we know that for some  it will be the case that
'xi(ht) " for all ht with t  . Now let xj be any machine in Sj that plays the cooperative action
ae
j on ht(x
ic;xE
j ) and on every continuation history that follows it. Then, using (B.23), we knowNon-Halting Strategies 24
that the (expected) continuation payo to xj after history ht(x
ic;xE
j ) is greater or equal to
e
jP
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j )) + j(";ae
j)P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j )) + w
j P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (Qi)(B.24)
where w
j is the lowest payo that j can achieve in any outcome of the stage game G.
Similar reasoning, using (B.21), now shows that the (expected) continuation payo to xE
j , after
the history of play ht(x
ic;xE
j ) is less than or equal to
j(x
ic;xE
j jht(x
ic;xE
j ))P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j ))+
j(")P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j )) + e
jP
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (Qi)
(B.25)
where (") = maxaj2Aj j(";aj).
Our next step will be that of comparing the lower bound in (B.24) with the upper bound in
(B.25). To this end, it is useful to establish a piece of notation for the `fraction of the time' that a
given machine xj does not cooperate when playing against x
ic after history ht(x
ic;xj). For any xj
2 Sj, let20
zj(xj;c) = liminf
T!1
  ft  T j ajt(x
ic;xjjht(x
ic;xj)) 6= ae
j g
  
T
(B.26)
It is also convenient to establish a piece of notation for the dierence between the ecient payo e
j
and the second largest payo that j can achieve in any outcome of G. Let s
j = maxfj 2 IR such
that j 6= e
j and j = j(a) for some a 2 Ag, and dene
j = e
j   s
j (B.27)
From the lower bound in (B.24) and the upper bound in (B.25), and using (B.26), (B.27) and
the best response part of Assumption 3, we can now compute a lower bound for the dierence in
expected continuation payo to the cooperative strategy xj and the equilibrium strategy xE
j . In
fact, the following must hold
P
xi2Si P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (xi)(xi;xjjht(x
ic;xE
j ))  
P
xi2Si P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (xi)(xi;xE
j jht(x
ic;xE
j )) 
zj(xE
j ;c)jP
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j )) + (w
j   e
j)P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (Qi)
(B.28)
Observe now that the left-hand side of (B.28) must in fact be less than or equal to zero. This
is simply because equilibrium strategies are required to maximize expected payos from the begin-
ning of G1 and hence must be optimal after any history that take place with positive probability.
20As is standard, the notation jjjj denotes the cardinality of a set.Non-Halting Strategies 25
Moreover, note that since, by construction, x
ic 2 Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j )) we also know that
P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (Ci(ht(x
ic;xE
j ))  P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (x
ic) (B.29)
Using these two facts it is now immediate to see that (B.28) implies
0  zj(xE
j ;c)jP
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (x
ic) + (w
j   e
j)P
ht(x

ic;x
E
j )
i (Qi) (B.30)
Using (B.8) of the Communication Lemma, and rearranging, (B.30) directly implies that
0  czj(xE
j ;c)j + w
j   e
j (B.31)
Since (B.31) must hold for all c, and since we know that j > 0, we can now conclude that
lim
c!1 zj(xE
j ;c) = 0 (B.32)
Since (B.32) tells us that machine xE
j plays the cooperative action `almost all the time' against
x
ic after history ht(x
ic;xE
j ), we can also conclude that
lim
c!1
j(x
ic;xE
j jht(x
ic;xE
j )) = e
j (B.33)
Since G is a game of common interest, (B.33) implies that
lim
c!1 i(x
ic;xE
j jht(x
ic;xE
j )) = e
i (B.34)
Finally, since the innitely repeated game G1 is undiscounted, (B.34) implies that
lim
c!1
i(x
ic;xE
j ) = e
i (B.35)
as required by the statement of the Lemma.
Lemma B.7: There exists Ri  IN i = 1;2 such that (provided the equilibrium set is not empty)
E(R) = e (B.36)
Proof: Given Lemma B.6 the proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 5 in A-S. The details are
omitted.
Lemma B.8: Let R = (R1;R2) be as in (B.19) of the proof of the Communication Lemma B.5.
Then E(;R) 6= ; for any  with 0    1.Non-Halting Strategies 26
Proof: The proof of this claim is constructive and is, mutatis mutandis, identical to the proof of
Lemma 6 in A-S. The details are omitted.
Proof of Theorem 1: The claim is a direct consequence of Lemma B.7 and Lemma B.8.
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